While many in Southeast Asia might welcome a more assertive Japan as a potential counterweight to China, the reality is that Tokyo’s security assistance package is still too modest to make a dent. Japan also risks overstretching itself by transcending its traditional role as a constructive economic power.
In addition, there are doubts as to whether either the unpopular Kishida administration or its key partners in Southeast Asia are in a position to sustain a major strategic realignment against China, which wields tremendous influence in the region.
Kishida has gradually signalled a new foreign policy direction during the past year. In his keynote address at the 2022 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, he launched his “realism diplomacy”, which effectively ended the country’s development-centred foreign policy. With a reminder that Japan is the world’s third-largest economy, he underscored the necessity for his country to play a more pivotal role in shaping the international security architecture.
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Xi and Kishida reaffirm Japan-China strategic relations in rare leader talks after Apec summit
Xi and Kishida reaffirm Japan-China strategic relations in rare leader talks after Apec summit
Accordingly, Tokyo has decided to double its defence spending as a percentage of its gross domestic product during the next five years. It wants to expand its naval capacity through production of modern frigates to project power globally and develop long-range missiles as well as next-generation military technology, most notably sixth-generation fighter jets.
While Japan has expanded security cooperation with India, Australia and North Atlantic Treaty Organization members, it has also stepped up defence aid to friendly nations in its own neighbourhood. Under its new security assistance package, Japan designated Bangladesh, Fiji, Malaysia and the Philippines as its first recipients.
“Japan will continue to contribute to the enhancement of the Philippines’ security capabilities, thereby contributing to regional peace and stability,” Kishida said before a joint session of the Philippine legislature this month. He similarly emphasised expanded maritime security cooperation during his visit to Malaysia, which like the Philippines has been at loggerheads with China over disputed features in the South China Sea.
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida (seated) visits a Philippine Coast Guard vessel in Manila on November 4 during his three-day official visit to Southeast Asia. Photo: Kyodo
Japan’s new strategic direction raises three major questions. To begin with, the new security assistance package is too modest to make any major impact. The total amount for the four designated nations is only 2 billion yen (US$13.4 million). A significant portion is for the Philippines, most notably the 600 million yen coastal radar system for the armed forces.
With China rapidly modernising its navy, Japan’s assistance seems like a drop in the ocean. Given the asymmetry of military power between Beijing and its rival claimants in Southeast Asia, the security assistance package will have to be expanded.
Second, a more substantial Japanese defence role in the region carries its own set of risks. For instance, there is growing possibility of a Visiting Forces Agreement-style deal between Tokyo and Manila, which would allow the Japanese military to expand its access to strategic Philippine bases.
In theory, this should enhance Philippine-Japan interoperability and Manila’s overall deterrence capabilities. However, it could also inadvertently reinforce brinkmanship between Manila and Beijing amid an already volatile situation in the South China Sea.
If anything, Tokyo also risks undermining its traditional area of strength. Historically, post-war Japan has gained tremendous soft power in Southeast Asia through its development-oriented foreign policy. A more military-oriented Japan could end up overstretching its finite resources and alienating some regional partners.
This brings us to the final hurdle. Many in Southeast Asia still remember Imperial Japan’s atrocities during World War II. It remains to be seen how Tokyo will address lingering concerns over a seeming lack of a full apology and reparations for surviving victims, most notably “comfort women” in places such as the Philippines.
Also consider the unpopularity of the current right-wing government in Tokyo, which has yet to overcome factional differences over the direction of the country’s foreign policy, including the controversial proposal to amend the country’s pacifist constitution.
Meanwhile, key Southeast Asian nations have made it clear they will steer clear of aligning with any major power against the other. They also want to maintain their robust economic ties with China in spite of maritime disputes in the South China Sea.
As Anwar argued in a recent public event in the US, “Malaysia, just like many other countries in Asean, remains fiercely independent. We work to serve our country and we will continue to engage everyone.” In short, Japan could have a hard time assembling an anti-China alliance in Southeast Asia, which still prefers to focus on constructive and developmental cooperation.
Richard Heydarian is a Manila-based academic and author of Asia’s New Battlefield: US, China and the Struggle for Western Pacific, and the forthcoming Duterte’s Rise
