The 94-paragraph joint statement issued last week at the Brics summit by the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa contained the event’s most significant outcome towards the very end, in paragraph 91. It referred to the decision to invite Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to become full members of the group from next January.
The group that was founded with the four nations in June 2009, and later incorporated South Africa, has now more than doubled its membership. Furthermore, the enlarged Brics will have six of the top 10 oil-producing nations of the world – Saudi Arabia, Russia, China, the UAE, Brazil and Iran.
This energy determinant will give Brics greater heft in the next few decades. Yet it is debatable whether the expanded group will have enough cohesion to be an effective bloc given the disparate strategic priorities of its members.
Brics was envisioned as a group of major emerging market nations that were expected to dominate the world economy by 2050. But the unstated geopolitical undercurrent was more than evident.
While the world was not as polarised in 2009 as it is now, at the core of the grouping lay the China-Russia partnership, seeking to resist US-led hegemony, and the brittle China-India relationship. The anti-US orientation of China and Russia has been on display in many domains and this has been exacerbated by the war in Ukraine.
India has, until recent years, refused to be drawn into either the camp opposed to the US and the Western alliance or that opposed to China. However, increasing Chinese belligerence that adversely impacts India’s core interests is pushing New Delhi firmly into the American corner.
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Biden, Modi hail new era of US-India ties and tout deals
Biden, Modi hail new era of US-India ties and tout deals
In the run-up to the Brics summit in South Africa, the Economist attempted to answer the question, “What if India and China became friends?”, and argued that the possibility of this happening was tantalising.
The much heralded “ Asian century” mooted at the turn of the century and gradually put on the back-burner, given the developments over the past 15 years in particular, could be resurrected and the subsequent impact on global geopolitics and geoeconomics would be radical. However, this possibility is as elusive as it is alluring, given the current troubled Sino-Indian relationship.
The pre-summit buzz in South Africa was that the expansion of Brics was favoured by China and Russia, while India and Brazil preferred a more gradual approach. It appears that a compromise was reached.
The other issue that aroused interest was the possibility of a meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to resolve the festering territorial impasse in the Galwan region of Ladakh. After army personnel of the two nations clashed in the high Himalayas in mid-2020, leading to the death of soldiers on both sides, the bilateral relationship has been strained.
The difference in emphasis in the reporting of an interaction between Xi and Modi on August 23 on the sidelines of the summit is indicative of the prevailing trust deficit.
On August 24, Indian Foreign Secretary Vinay Kwatra said Modi had engaged in a “conversation” with Xi and conveyed “India’s concerns on the unresolved issues along the [Line of Actual Control]”. On August 25, the Chinese foreign ministry described the interaction as a “candid and in-depth exchange of views”, and added that the meeting took place at India’s request.
The Indian media then cited unnamed sources saying there had been a “pending request” for a bilateral meeting from China, countering the Chinese narrative that India had requested the interaction.
Regardless, with both sides sticking to their respective national positions on contested territoriality, the tangled, intractable status quo between the two Asian giants persists.
The most critical global challenges that warrant collective action are climate change and environmental degradation. Concerted cooperation by the world’s major powers is imperative.
Both China and India have a shared responsibility to their own citizens to develop appropriate national policies that will harmonise with the global effort. While the issue has been highlighted at the Brics summit, there is a need for much greater funding and political support to redress our planet’s already precarious situation.
There had been speculation that the G20 summit may provide an opportunity for a more substantive meeting between Xi and Modi. For India, there is a high degree of symbolism and prestige attached to Modi hosting G20 leaders in New Delhi. US President Joe Biden has confirmed his in-person participation and Russian President Vladimir Putin has conveyed his regrets, as he did for the Brics meeting. Xi, however, is now likely to skip the summit, according to latest media reports.
It is a reflection of the parlous state of India-China relations that the leaders of the two nations have not been able to meet bilaterally due to their respective positions on contested territoriality.
Whether this will be deemed strategic perspicacity or misplaced petulance remains moot. If China and India can arrive at a modus vivendi and move forward in a less acrimonious manner, many long-term benefits can be accrued regionally and globally.
But, on current evidence, this appears unlikely, and short-term domestic political compulsions are likely to trump all other options. As a result, the Asian century will remain elusive.
Uday Bhaskar is director of the Society for Policy Studies (SPS), an independent think tank based in New Delhi
